Anonymous veto network

In cryptography, the anonymous veto network (or AV-net) is a multi-party secure computation protocol to compute the boolean-OR function. It was first proposed by Feng Hao and Piotr Zieliński in 2006.[1] This protocol presents an efficient solution to the Dining cryptographers problem.

A related protocol that securely computes a boolean-count function is open vote network (or OV-net).

Description

All participants agree on a group with a generator of prime order in which the discrete logarithm problem is hard. For example, a Schnorr group can be used. For a group of participants, the protocol executes in two rounds.

Round 1: each participant selects a random value and publishes the ephemeral public key together with a zero-knowledge proof for the proof of the exponent . A detailed description of a method for such proofs is found in RFC 8235.

After this round, each participant computes:

Round 2: each participant publishes and a zero-knowledge proof for the proof of the exponent . Here, the participants chose if they want to send a "0" bit (no veto), or a random value if they want to send a "1" bit (veto).

After round 2, each participant computes . If no one vetoed, each will obtain . On the other hand, if one or more participants vetoed, each will have .

The protocol design

The protocol is designed by combining random public keys in such a structured way to achieve a vanishing effect. In this case, . For example, if there are three participants, then . A similar idea, though in a non-public-key context, can be traced back to David Chaum's original solution to the Dining cryptographers problem.[2]

gollark: Sort of. Not really.
gollark: You put your bootloader there.
gollark: An EFI system partition is where it looks for EFI files to boot.
gollark: As opposed to the older BIOS.
gollark: UEFI is the recent and rather apioidal standard for booting computers.

References

  1. F. Hao, P. Zieliński. A 2-round anonymous veto protocol. Proceedings of the 14th International Workshop on Security Protocols, 2006.
  2. David Chaum. The Dining Cryptographers Problem: Unconditional Sender and Recipient Untraceability Journal of Cryptology, vol. 1, No, 1, pp. 65-75, 1988
This article is issued from Wikipedia. The text is licensed under Creative Commons - Attribution - Sharealike. Additional terms may apply for the media files.