AK Trolls

AK Trolls (Turkish: AK Troller, Aktroller) are state-sponsored anonymous Internet political commentators and trolls, as well as TUGVA - Turkey Youth Foundation recruited by the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey. In 2015 it was confirmed that AK Trolls are directly funded by the state, with most of the state-sponsored Internet trolls being people aged 20–25. The youth wing of the Justice and Development Party (AK Gençlik) is presumed responsible for heading the web brigade.[1]. In 2020 Twitter Safety banned and archived 7,340 accounts pushing Justice and Development Party (AKP) Disinformation against Greece and the European Union on matters like Illegal immigration, Hagia Sophia and the Aegean dispute.

Background

AK Trolls came to existence in 2013[2] after the Gezi Park protests where protesters used social media to organize and publicize protests against the government and the authoritarian tendencies of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. As a reaction, the AKP recruited 6,000 people to a new social media team, known as the New Turkey Digital Office, to promote state propaganda and orchestrate campaigns against individuals identified as being opponents of AKP.[3] Internet bots are extensively used by government as well to assist paid individuals.[4] AK Trolls mainly target anyone who opposes the policies of incumbent President Erdoğan, which can range from Kurdish leftists to Kemalists.[5]

AK Trolls favored a 'Yes' vote for the constitutional changes sought by Erdoğan.[6]

Early 2020 Twitter Take-down

Twitter Safety statement: [7] "Based on our analysis of the network’s technical indicators and account behaviors, the collection of fake and compromised accounts was being used to amplify political narratives favorable to the AK Parti, and demonstrated strong support for President Erdogan. We’re disclosing 7,340 accounts to the archive today."

2020 Status

Many accounts are still active, resulting in constant harassment and disinformation campaigns on matters such as the violations of the Greek EEZ. The accounts have been linked with Turkish Bot Farms as well as Pakistani Bot Farms in attempts to gain population support from citizens of both countries, directing hate to Greece and other European countries like France.

Subjects of Disinformation in 2020 Via Twitter
  • The Illegal immigration push on the borders of Evros orchestrated by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. With hashtags like: #Killergreece #katilyunanistan #RefugeeKillerGreece #persecutionofgreece #humancrimeingreece #GreeceAgainstHumanity #TerroristGreece #murderergreece #FascistGreece #GreekTerror #GreeceAttacksRefugees #Greecekillssyrianrefugees #StopGreeceAggression #shameonyouGreece #barbargreek #yunan #stopthegreekterror #IdoNotStandWithGreece #barbariangreeks #YunanistanSucİsliyor #europethebarbarian
  • The conversion of Hagia Sophia to a mosque. Where a special campaign was orchestrated by TUGVA - Turkey Youth Foundation through their numerous accounts on twitter, hosted on sevdamizidokuyoruz.com, where users where able to generate an image with Hagia Sophia and their name following that picture, and post it online. With hashtags like: #İlmekİlmekAyasofya #AyasofyaCamii #AyasofyaCamidir #AyasofyaCamiOlacak #AyasofyaMilliDavadır #AyasofyaCamiiAçılacaktır #HagiaSophiaMosque #AyasofyaCamiOldu #DijitalHalı #KurbanOlurumAyasofya #Ayasofya
  • The illegal entry of RV MTA Oruç Reis in the Greek EEZ Aegean dispute, under the maximalist ideology of Mavi Vatan. With hashtags like: #Oruc_Reis #OrucReis #MaviVatan #CumhurittifakıHesaplarYanYana #MaviVatandaTavizYok #MaviVatandaTavizVerme

Methods

AK Trolls use social media networks (i.e. Facebook, Twitter)[8] in an organized way to promote the AKP,[9] discredit opposition, and attack individuals by spreading false information about them on the Internet. MPs from CHP and HDP asked to start an investigation on AK Trolls as the group is extensively employed to silence individuals by character assassination, insulting, and threatening.[10][3] Using images to incite an emotional response from the target population.

Common Visuals

Images might include:

  • Military themed subjects with dramatic music.
  • Adding the Turkish or Greek flag on irrelevant videos that fit the narrative.
  • Comic strips or early propaganda.
  • Videos and news publications with visual material not related by means of time nor space to the events described (migrant photos in the sea, deceased migrants), on occasions photo-shoots being staged by NGOs to serve the narrative of helplessness.
  • The depiction of wolf images Grey Wolves (organization), in variations of using the logo or just images of wolves in offensive styled poses.
  • Unofficial or self-styled maps and arguments from non-relevant areas of the world, on maritime borders and Exclusive economic zones.
  • Images of Turkish politicians responsible for the Greek genocide.
  • Images showing a conglomeration of flags of supporting countries.

Common Messaging

Messages might include:

  • Drowning the Greeks at sea. How capable a Greek citizen is at swimming. Checking the temperature of the water.
  • Quotes about wolves.
  • Blue Homeland being the target.
  • NAVTEX and NAVTEX Spamming.
  • Vague threats of "Coming one night".
  • A lot of Turkish flags accompanied by text with many grammatical errors.
gollark: But yeah, proof of work is an... okay... solution to the problem of allocating krist without it being specific to a server or something, it's just not ideal because it wastes everyone's GPU power.
gollark: I mean, not too much *new* krist.
gollark: I don't think there's a problem with too much krist.
gollark: Krist is in a weird position of being vaguely cryptocurrency-ish in that it uses anonymous-ish addresses and uses proof of work, but being completely centralized and not really having a use for the b l o c k c h a i n feature.
gollark: I probably could, on my desktop's somewhat dead GTX 1050, but meh.

See also

References
  1. Leo Benedictus. "Invasion of the troll armies: 'Social media where the war goes on' | Media". The Guardian. Retrieved 2017-03-12.
  2. Jonathan Okun (2017-01-31). "Cybersecurity Strategy Advice for the Trump Administration: US-Turkey Relations - The Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies". Jsis.washington.edu. Retrieved 2017-03-12.
  3. "Turkish journalists face abuse and threats online as trolls step up attacks | World news". The Guardian. 2016-04-23. Retrieved 2017-03-12.
  4. Mert Taşçılar. "Odatv AKTroller'i açığa çıkaran o raporu yayımlıyor". Odatv.com. Retrieved 2017-03-12.
  5. "Aktroller ne kadar maaş alıyor? – Sözcü Gazetesi". Sozcu.com.tr. 2015-09-29. Retrieved 2017-03-12.
  6. ""AK trolls" were detrimental to the "Yes" camp - BARÇIN YİNANÇ". Hürriyet Daily News. Retrieved 20 May 2017.
  7. "Disclosing networks of state-linked information operations we've removed". Twitter Safety. 2020-12-06.
  8. "Mapping Turkey's Twitter-troll lynch mobs". The Daily Dot. 22 October 2015. Retrieved 2017-03-12.
  9. "Erdoğan attends 'Ak troll' wedding, chats with well-known suspect - POLITICS". Hurriyetdailynews.com. 2011-09-13. Retrieved 2017-03-12.
  10. "'AkTroller' hakkında soru önergesi". Birgun.net. 2016-12-21. Retrieved 2017-03-12.
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