2018 Eastbourne International – Women's Doubles
Latisha Chan and Martina Hingis were the defending champions, but Hingis retired from professional tennis at the end of 2017. Chan played alongside Peng Shuai, but they lost in the first round to Irina-Camelia Begu and Mihaela Buzărnescu.
Women's Doubles | |
---|---|
2018 Eastbourne International | |
Champions | |
Runners-up | |
Final score | 6–3, 7–5 |
Gabriela Dabrowski and Xu Yifan won the title, defeating Begu and Buzărnescu in the final, 6–3, 7–5.
Seeds
Andrea Sestini Hlaváčková / Barbora Strýcová (First round) Andreja Klepač / María José Martínez Sánchez (Quarterfinals, retired) Latisha Chan / Peng Shuai (First round) Gabriela Dabrowski / Xu Yifan (Champions)
Draw
Key
- Q = Qualifier
- WC = Wild Card
- LL = Lucky Loser
- Alt = Alternate
- SE = Special Exempt
- PR = Protected Ranking
- ITF = ITF entry
- JE = Junior Exempt
- w/o = Walkover
- r = Retired
- d = Defaulted
Draw
First Round | Quarterfinals | Semifinals | Final | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
1 | 2 | 65 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
6 | 77 | 2 | 1r | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
2 | 65 | 6 | 2 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
6 | 77 | 6 | 0 | [6] | |||||||||||||||||||||||
3 | 4 | 6 | [7] | 4 | 6 | [10] | |||||||||||||||||||||
6 | 3 | [10] | 6 | 6 | |||||||||||||||||||||||
3 | 77 | [10] | 2 | 4 | |||||||||||||||||||||||
6 | 63 | [6] | 3 | 5 | |||||||||||||||||||||||
6 | 5 | [10] | 4 | 6 | 7 | ||||||||||||||||||||||
1 | 7 | [6] | 4 | 4 | |||||||||||||||||||||||
WC | 6 | 1 | [7] | 4 | 6 | 6 | |||||||||||||||||||||
4 | 2 | 6 | [10] | 4 | 64 | 7 | [13] | ||||||||||||||||||||
3 | 7 | [7] | 77 | 5 | [11] | ||||||||||||||||||||||
6 | 5 | [10] | 3 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
6 | 5 | [5] | 2 | 0r | |||||||||||||||||||||||
2 | 3 | 7 | [10] |
gollark: If humans are acting rationally at achieving some sort of hidden goalset, you have to ask what that actually is.
gollark: But it's not toward actual stated goals.
gollark: You can only really say something is "rational" as a way to achieve some goals, not just objectively "rational" on its own. So arguably humans are somewhat rationally maximizing short-term happiness. *But*, isn't happiness at least partly just a heuristic for decision-making *too*?
gollark: This can probably just be read as "strong time preference" again, I guess, *partly*.
gollark: https://xkcd.com/2278/
References
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