To answer your boiled-down question: How insecure is email? Practically speaking email is subject to attack by DNS spoofing, WIFI interception, and untrusted network administrators just to name a few.
To mitigate this you need to consider the different aspects that need security. It's likely most companies will fall short in security in at least one of the following areas, so anything you send could be in clear text and visible by someone other than your intended recipient.
Under each facet of security I listed relevant products grouped by how they are technically implemented. Ask yourself these questions based on the content you're sending over email:
Message Sender Verification
Does the recipient need proof that it was you who actually sent the message?
- SenderID/SPF Records (weak verification)
- Domain Keys / DKIM (strength depends on implementation)
- DMARC (Strong validation of the display from user... hybrid of SenderID and DomainKeys)
- PGP or s/MIME (may cause compliance issues if journaling or message auditing is required)
- Portal-based products (Voltage, Proofpoint, Zixmail)
- Microsoft RMS server + Outlook
Message Transport
Do I need to prevent unauthorized reading or modification of the email sender's MTA and my MTA?
- Enforced TLS, with certificate validation. Non-validated certs are subject to MITM attacks.
- Zix-based TLS is a private TLS network that doesn't require manual configuration
- PGP or s/MIME (may cause compliance issues if journaling or message auditing is required)
- Portal-based products (Voltage, Proofpoint, Zixmail)
- Microsoft RMS server + Outlook
Reading the message
Must I ensure that only the intended recipient is able to read the message content?
- PGP or s/MIME (may cause compliance issues if journaling or message auditing is required)
- Portal-based products (Voltage, Proofpoint, Zixmail)
- Microsoft RMS server
Must the client endpoint be secure? (applies if above 3 products aren't used)
- The target network administrator is delivering email using a secure transport (Encrypted MAPI, POP3 over TLS, etc)
- The target device is secure. This applies to workstations, and mobile devices.
- Microsoft UAG adds features to OWA where the endpoint is audited and will delete left-over attachments in
%temp%
and restrict or deny access to features as policy dictates
- An alternative to UAG is to block attachments from reaching the client (as Henri first mentioned)